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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
sional or unethical act or conduct of the lawyer." And the court concludes
with a statement that it is the corresponding duty of the bar association, as
the organized representative Of the profession, to examine and inquire into
the subject-matter of such a communication in order that the alleged griev-
ance may be redressed or corrected.
The prevailing rule or principle has been announced to be that a publica-
tion is conditionally, or qualifiedly privileged, "whenever the author and pub-
lisher of the alleged slander acted in the bona fide discharge of a public or
private duty, legal or moral; or in the prosecution of his own rights or in-
terest." White v. Nicholls (U. S. 1845) 3 How. 266; Townhend, SLANDER
AND LIBEL (4th ed. 1890) secs. 209, 237; 32 C. J. 1241. "A publication is
therefore prima facie qualifiedly privileged where circumstances obtain with
respect to a right or duty to communicate to others what, of right, they
ought to know, even though it is not a legal, but only a moral or social duty
of imperfect obligation." State ex rel. Zorn v. Cox (1927) 318 Mo. 112, 298
S. W. 837. "Privilege rebuts the presumption of malice, and the burden of
proof is cast upon the plaintiff to prove express malice." Sullivan v. Com-
mission Co. (1899) 152 Mo. 268, 53 S. W. 912. The case at bar is, however,
a step beyond certain of the authorities relied upon, in that in the cases in-
volving communications to a medical society or a church body the com-
municant seems to have been a member of the group rather than an inde-
pendent layman. McKnight v. Hasbrouck (1890) 17 R. I. 70, 20 Atl. 95;
Farnsworth v. Storrs (Mass. 1850) 5 Cush. 412. A number of recent cases
have held that voluntary communications to proper authorities of violations
of the National Prohibition Act are qualifiedly privileged. Wasylenko v.
Frysky (1927) 130 Misc. 716, 224 N. Y. S. 329; Popke v. Hoffman (1926) 21
Ohio App. 454, 153 N. E. 248.
The decision would seem, then, to be an extension of an accepted rule into
an essentially similar, though new, field of activity. The policy of aiding
to uphold the standards of legal profession is undoubtedly sound. If the
publication of such communications is not qualifiedly privileged the useful-
ness of organizations of professional men and women is limited to a mere
exchange of ideas or social intercourse, or the correction of misconduct oc-
curring directly within the sphere of the association's cognizance.
C. V. E., '31.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--REGULATIONS OF STREETS-PROHIBITIONS or
PARKING.-The recent ordinance prohibiting parking of automobiles in the
downtown district of Chicago during business hours, in the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Illinois was an unreasonable exercise of the power of the
municipality to regulate traffic. The arrest and fine of a local attorney who
left his car outside his downtown office while engaged in a thirty-minute
conference with a client brought the validity of the enactment before the
court. The decision invalidated legislation which was the result of a survey
of traffic congestion conditions which had cost the city over $50,000. Hag-
genjos v. City of Chicago (1929) 336 Ill. 573, 168 N. E. 661.
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The ordinance in question applied to the "loop," a downtown business dis-
trict about nine blocks in length by eight blocks in width, between the hours
of 7 and 6 on any regular business day, Saturday afternoons and holidays
being excepted. The enactment did not apply to ambulances, emergency
vehicles of the United States, City of Chicago, or Cook County, or to public
utility vehicles while the operator thereof was engaged in emergency duties.
The argument in the opinion is devoid of support for the conclusion
reached. In holding the ordinance to be void the court concedes a number
of propositions which could well have formed the basis of the opposite ruling.
The court recognizes that a municipality has the power to regulate the use
of its streets and the traffic upon them, and points out that modern condi-
tions call for drastic restrictions. The court concedes quite properly and
reasonably, that the ordinance notwithstanding its literal terms, did not
prohibit the stops permitted or directed by other ordinances such as those
for loading and unloading merchandise, stops in traffic, and other necessary
stops.
Citation of authorities is rather unnecessary to demonstrate that this deci-
sion is undoubtedly out of line with the modern viewpoint, but a few recent
cases may be helpful. Ordinances prohibiting parking in certain restricted
localities between certain hours, or at all times, or limiting the parking
privilege to one hour, thirty minutes, or even a shorter period are common
and have been sustained. Pugh v. City of Des Moines (1916) 176 Iowa 593,
156 N. W. 892; Welsh v. Town of Morristown (N. J. 1923) 121 Atl. 697, af-
firmed in Welsh v. Potts (1924) 99 N. J. L. 528, 124 Atl. 926; Cavanaugh V.
Gerk (1926) 313 Mo. 375, 280 S. W. 51. Prohibition of taxicab stands in
certain areas and on certain streets has been uniformly upheld. City of
New Orleans v. Calamari (1922) 150 La. 737, 91 So. 172; Sanders V. Atlanta
(1918) 147 Ga. 819, 95 S. E. 695. In the same way other vehicles have been
prohibited from the use of portions of streets designated as taxicab stands.
Commonwealth v. Rice (1927) 261 Mass. 340, 158 N. E. 797. Certain types
of vehicles have been prohibited from using streets in certain areas at any
time. Smallwood v. District of Columbia (Dist. Col. 1927) 17 F. (2) 210.
To relieve congestion cities have been permitted to designate streets for one-
way traffic only. Commonwealth v. Nolan (1920) 189 Ky. 34, 224 S. W. 506.
It has been held within the police power of a city to regulate traffic on par-
ticular streets, even to complete exclusion of busses therefrom. Peoples'
Rapid Transit Co. v. Atlantic City (N. J. 1929) 144 AtI. 630. While the en-
actment in the principal case is perhaps wider in its scope than those in cer-
tain of the above cases, to declare it unreasonable and invalid seems as lack-
ing in legal justification as it is unmindful of practical metropolitan traffic
conditions. C. V. E., '31.
TORTS--APPLCATION OF FLETCHER V. RYLANDS PRINCIPLE TO PIPE LINE
COMPANis.-In the case of Behle v. Shell Pipe Line Co. (Mo. 1929) 17 S.
W. (2d) 1056, the question involved was the defendant's liability for damage
to plaintiff's land caused by the escape of oil through a leak or break in de-
fendant's pipe line. The case went to the jury on a presumption of negli-
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